4.15. Structures with (some) nite basic sets. There is an obvious, trivial way by which we can reduce the problem of intensional identity for any structure A of nite signature to that of another such structure A 0 in which all basic sets are in nite. If, for example, U = fu 1 ; : : :; u n g is nite and f : U V * W is a partial function among the givens, we replace f in A by n new partial functions f i : V * W; f i (v) ' f(u i ; v); i = 1; : : : ; n: The translation is a bit messier for functionals but still trivial in principle. This is, in fact what we will do if U is a small nite set, e.g., if U = TV = ft; fg is the set of truth values. If, however, n is immense, then this reduction leads to a structure with impossibly many primitives whose dictionary is totally unmanageable. Suppose, for example, that the language is a small (in theory formalized) fragment of the basic English currently in use as the common language of business in continental Europe. There are few basic sets in the intended interpretation, the citizens of France, the German cars, the Greek raisins, etc., but they are all immense. We may also assume few primitives, we are only interested in making simple assertions like there are enough Greek raisins to satisfy the needs of all Frenchmen. The problem of sense identity for sentences of such a language appears to be quite manageable, and in fact, the actual dictionaries we would use to translate this language into the national European languages are quite small. In contrast, the formal dictionary of the expanded language suggested by the trivial procedure of eliminating all the nite basic sets is absurdly large and involves speci c entries detailing separately the relation between every Frenchman with every Greek raisin. The decision procedure we described allows a better solution.
4.16. Corollary (to the proof). Suppose A = (U 1 ; : : :; U k ; f 1 ; : : :; f n ) is a recursor structure of nite signature, such that every basic set U i has at least d members. Then the decision procedure for intensional identity de ned in this section will decide correctly every identity on A with n (free and bound) basic variables, provided that 2n + 4 d.
The Corollary suggests a method of constructing a reasonably sized \dictio-nary of meanings" for a structure in which some basic sets are very small|and we eliminate these|and the others are very large. The formal decision procedure for intensional identity on the basis of this dictionary is not that far from the way we would decide such questions in practice: we understand quanti cation over small sets by considering individual cases, while for large sets we appeal to fundamental identities relating the meanings of the primitives, including the quanti ers. The procedure will fail to resolve questions of identity of meaning which involve more quanti ers over large sets than (roughly) half the size of the structure. The proof of the Corollary follows from a careful examination of the arguments of this section, which basically require the existence of enough possible values for variables to make certain distinctions. For example, it is not hard to check that Lemma 4.3 holds, provided all the basic sets of the structure have at least 4 elements. We will omit the details. 4.14. Lemma. An identity implies the validity of every line it generates.
Proof. We now assume that we are given an extended assignment to the variables of the line which satis es the antecedent, and we must show that it also satis es the consequent.
Notice that assigns distinct values other than ? to all the basic variables which occur free both in the line and in the identity, because of the clauses we introduced in Step 3. We extend to the remaining free basic variables in the equation by giving a distinct, new value to each of them. We want to extend to all the pf variables also, so that we get (z i ) ' (x i ); (90) for every i = 1; : : :; m. This is already true when z i is a basic variable, because of the equations put in the line in Step 1.
To e ect (90), for z i (u 1 ; : : :; u arity(i) )r(a 1 ; : : : ; a k ); we want to de ne (r) so that (r)( (a 1 ); : : :; (a k )) ' (x i )( (u 1 ); : : : ; (u arity(i) )) (91) for every which agrees with on all the variables except (perhaps) u 1 ; : : :; u arity(i) . This will be possible, unless there is another expression z j (v 1 ; : : :; v arity(j) )r(b 1 ; : : : ; b k ) which then demanded (r)( (b 1 ); : : : ; (b k )) ' (x j )( (v 1 ); : : :; (v arity(j) )); (92) but for some assignment as above we have the con ict (a 1 ); : : : ; (a k ) ' (b 1 ); : : :; (b k ); (93) (x i )( (u 1 ); : : :; (u arity(i) )) 6 = (x j )( (v 1 ); : : :; (v arity(j) )): (94) First we argue that if (93) holds, then the terms z i and z j can be uni ed. Let w(1); : : : ; w(l) be the distinct values that assigns to the variables u 1 ; : : : ; u arity(i) , v 1 ; : : :; v arity(j) (it maybe that l = 0), choose distinct, fresh variables s(1); : : :; s(l) and set (u ) ( a ; if (u ) = (a ); s(w( (u ))); otherwise; where a is meant to be a variable not among u 1 ; : : :; u arity (i) . Notice that if the rst case of the de nition applies, then the variable a is uniquely determined, because agrees with on these variables and assigns a distinct value to each of them. We give a similar de nition of another variable transformation on the v 's and then observe that because of (93), these transformations de ne a uni er of z i with z j with the bound variables s 1 ; : : : ; s l .
Using Lemma 4.12, we can nd a maximal uni er of z i , z j from which the one just constructed can be obtained by further specifying or identifying some of the bound variables. It follows that in Step 2 of the construction of the line we put in a clause which expresses the maximal uni cation of z i with z j and this easily contradicts (94). a with no bound variables left, so the line produced is x 3 = x; x 3 #; x 6 = x; x 6 #; x 1 (x; y) = x 4 ; x 6 = y; x#; y# =) f(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) = g(x 4 ; x 5 ; x 6 ): If we identify x y, we get the identity f( (ts)p(x; x; t; s); q(x); x) ' g(p(x; x; x; x); q(x); x) which has an additional (trivial) uni cation and generates the line x 3 = x; x 3 #; x 6 = x; x 6 #; x 1 (x; x) = x 4 ; x 2 = x 5 ; x# =) f(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) = g(x 4 ; x 5 ; x 6 ): It is quite easy to verify directly that the extended validity of these two lines is equivalent to the strict validity of the identity.
Lemma. The conjunction of all the lines constructed for (63) implies (63).
Proof. We will verify that if the line produced by an identity holds, then every strict assignment which assigns distinct values to distinct basic variables satis es the identity, from which the Lemma follows by applying it to all the substitution instances of the identity.
Suppose we are given a strict assignment to the variables of the identity and extend it to the special variables which occur on the line by setting (x i ) = (z i ): (88) It will be enough to verify that this assignment satis es the antecedent of the line, so consider how the clauses were introduced to it by the three steps of the construction.
Step 1. We put in x i = z i and x i # if z i is basic, and clearly makes these conditions true, by de nition and because it is strict on the variables which occur free in the identity.
Step 2. If the clause (86) is added to the antecedent of the line in this step, we must show that it is validated by , or equivalently that validates the term identity x i ( (u 1 ); : : : ; (u arity(i) )) ' x j ( (v 1 ); : : :; (v arity(j) )): (89) We compute: (x i ( (u 1 ); : : : ; (u arity(i) ))) ' (z i )( (u 1 ); : : : ; (u arity(i) )) ' (( (u 1 ; : : : ; u m )r(a 1 ; : : : ; a k ))( (u 1 ); : : :; (u arity(i) ))) ' (r( (a 1 ); : : :; (a k ))) ' (r( (b 1 ); : : :; (b k ))); where the last line follows from the fact that , are parts of a uni er. From this point we proceed with the opposite computation for z j , to complete the proof of (89).
Step 3. The clauses introduced by Step 3 are obviously validated by , which is assumed to assign distinct, strict values to distinct basic variables. a original expressions is obtained by adding s to the bound variables and extending and in the obvious way, (u i ) (v t ) s:
a Suppose now we are given an identity (63). We rst show how to construct a single dictionary line from it, which will determine the strict truth of (63) when all the free, basic variables in it are interpreted by distinct values in the domain. The complete set of lines for (63) will contain the lines we get in this way from all the identities which result from (63) by the identi cation of some of its free, basic variables.
We assume that the special variables x 1 ; : : :; x m we will use for the lines do not occur in the given identity.
Step 1. For each z i which is a basic variable, we put in the antecedent of the line the equality x i = z i and the condition x i #.
Step 2. Consider any pair z i , z j (i 6 = j) of expressions which are not basic variables; we will view these as -expressions by identifying temporarily a term r(x) with the -expression ( )r(x). If z i , z j cannot be uni ed, we add nothing to the line. In the opposite case, suppose z i (u 1 ; : : :; u arity(i) )r(x 1 ; : : : ; x k ); z j (v 1 ; : : : ; v arity(j) )r(y 1 ; : : :; y k ); and ( ; ; (s 1 ; : : :; s l )) is a maximal bvu for these expressions. We add to the antecedent of the line the equation (s 1 ; : : :; s l )x i ( (u 1 ); : : :; (u arity(i) )) ' (s 1 ; : : :; s l )x j ( (v 1 ); : : :; (v arity(j) )):
Step 3. After Steps 1 and 2 are completed, we add to the antecedent of the line the inequality u 6 = v and the conditions u #, v #, for every two free, basic variables which occur free on the line and are not among the standard x 1 ; : : :; x n . (If only one such u occurs, we simply add u#.)
To recapitulate what we said above, the complete set of lines associated with an identity is obtained by applying this procedure to every identity obtained by identifying some or all of the free basic variables of the identity.
To illustrate the procedure, consider again (77). There are no terms to unify here, only Steps 1 and 3 come up and we get the following two lines: x 1 = x; x 2 = y; x 3 = x; x 1 #; x 2 #; x 3 #; x 6 = y; x#; y# =) f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = g(x 3 ); x 1 = x; x 2 = x; x 3 = x; x 1 #; x 2 #; x 3 #; x# =) f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = g(x 3 ): The procedure generates only one line for (78):
x 1 = x; x 3 = x; x 1 #; x 3 #=) f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = g(x 3 ): Consider also the example f( (ts)p(x; y; t; s); q(x); x) ' g(p(x; y; x; y); q(y); x): (87) There are two free variables, so we will get two lines. First from the identity as it is, Step 2 will come into play with the most general bvu for z 1 and z 3 obviously being : t := x; s := y; 4.12. Lemma. (1) Every bounded variable uni er for two -terms as in (83) can be reduced to a maximal one.
(2) Two -terms have at most one maximal uni er, up to alphabetic change of the bound variables.
Proof. The critical number for two -terms as in (83) is the number of distinct variables among the u 1 ; : : :; u m , v 1 ; : : :; v n which actually occur in A and B. We will show by induction on the critical number, simultaneously, that if a bvu exists, then a unique maximal one exists and the given one is reducible to the maximal one. Notice that if there is any uni er at all, we must have A r(a 1 ; : : :; a k ); B r(b 1 ; : : :; b k ); (85) i.e., A and B must be terms involving the same pf variable.
At the basis, none of the variables occur, so there is only one possible uni er, the empty , , which reassigns no variables; it is a uni er exactly when the two expressions are identical and it is trivially maximal. We take this case of expressions of the form ( )A, ( )B to cover also (by convention) the case of terms A, B.
For the induction step, suppose u i actually occurs in A. We distinguish cases.
Case 1. For some j, a j u i but b j is none of the v t 's. In this case every uni er must set (u i ) b j , we make this replacement on the expressions and we get the result by applying the induction hypothesis to these new expressions which have smaller critical number since u i does not occur in them.
Case 2. For some j, a j u i , and for every j, if a j u i then b j is one of the v t 's, but there exist distinct j 6 = j 0 such that a j a j 0 u i and b j 6 b j 0 . In this case every uni er must satisfy (u i ) (b j ) (b j 0 ); and we can apply the ind. hyp. to the expressions resulting by identifying b j with b j 0 on the right, which have smaller critical number. Case 3. u i occurs in A, and for all j and some t, a j u i =) b j v t : In this case we look at the symmetric argument, taking Cases 1, 2 and 3 on v t . In the rst of these two we can use the induction hypothesis and the last leads us to the following: Case 4. u i occurs in A and there exists some v t which occurs in B at precisely all the same places where u i occurs in A.
In this case every uni er must set (u i ) (v t ), and this variable may be one of the bound or the free ones in the nal expressions. We choose a variable s not occurring anywhere, we replace u i in A and v t in B by s throughout and we apply the ind. hyp. to these new expressions with lower critical number to obtain some maximal bvu (if it exists) ( ; ; (s 1 ; : : : ; s k )); the maximal bvu for the which is valid, while for (78) we will get x 1 = x 3 ; x 1 #; x 3 #=) f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = g(x 3 ); which is not. (Actually there will be some additional \fringe" on the lines produced by the formal decision procedure, which will not a ect the validity of the lines.) 4.11. Suppose ( ; ;s) and ( 0 ; 0 ;s 0 ) are both bvu's for two -terms E and F.
We say that ( ; ;s) is reducible to ( 0 ; 0 ;s 0 ) if it \uni es no more," i.e., every variable in the sequences is also in the sequences 0 , if 0 (w) is not bound in ( 0 ; 0 ;s 0 ) then (w) = 0 (w), if (w) is bound in ( ; ;s) then (w) = 0 (w), and similarly with , 0 .
A bvu for two -terms is maximal, if there exists no other bvu for the same -terms with a longer sequence of bound variables. behaves exactly like a strict assignment on pf variables, but assigns members of the extended basic sets to the basic variables, i.e., it can set (v) = ?. An identity is strictly valid when it holds for all strict assignments, and extendedly valid if it holds for all extended assignments. 4.8. Dictionary lines. Choose once and for all xed, special variables x 1 ; : : : ; x l of types such that f(x 1 ; : : :; x m ) ' g(x m+1 ; : : :; x l ) (81) is well formed. A dictionary line for f and g is an implication of the form 4.9. Dictionaries. A line is valid (in the given structure) if every extended assignment which satis es its hypothesis also satis es its conclusion. This means that the choice of speci c extra variables is irrelevant to the validity of a line, and then a simple counting argument shows that the types of f and g determine an upper bound on the number of distinct (up to alphabetic change and reordering of hypotheses) lines. We x a su ciently large set of extra variables and list once and for all, all the lines in these variables which are valid for f and g in the given structure; this is the dictionary for f and g.
The dictionary of the structure A is the union of the dictionaries for all the pairs of functionals in A. It is a nite list of lines, perhaps not easy to construct for speci c structures with non-constructive givens, but in principle it can be written down.
We will associate (e ectively) with each identity (63) a speci c set of lines L such that the strict validity of (63) is equivalent to the extended validity of all the lines in L. It will be convenient to express these lines using the variables which occur in (63). To decide a speci c (63), we translate the lines of L into equivalent lines in the xed, chosen variables by an alphabetic change, and then (63) will be equivalent to the presence of these lines in the dictionary.
For example, (77) will be expressed (essentially) by the single line x 1 = x 3 ; x 1 #; x 2 #; x 3 #=) f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = g(x 3 ); bound variables at most q l(j) distinct terms; hence the total number of distinct terms on the right cannot exceed
Suppose the right-hand-side of (74) 4.7. Extended sets and assignments. Before describing the procedure which determines the validity of identities in form (63), we consider a simple example which illustrates one of the annoying subtleties we will need to deal with. Suppose g is a total, unary function on some set A and we de ne the total, binary function f by f(x; y) ' g(x): (77) Clearly (77) is a valid identity involving the old g and the new f we just de ned. Suppose we substitute a term in this to get f(x; p(x)) ' g(x); (78) now this is not valid, because for some values of the partial function p, p(x) will not be de ned, so neither will f(x; p(x)), while the right-hand-side is de ned. In dealing with partial functions and functionals as we have, validity of identities is not preserved by substitution of terms. One way to deal with this problem is to add an element ? to each basic set and view partial functions as total functions, which take the value ? when they should be unde ned. For each set A, we set A ? = A f?g = the extension of A: (79) We can now try to interpret identities by allowing the basic variables to range over the extended sets, so that the validity of (77) implies the validity of (78); this is ne, except that now (77) fails for the f we originally de ned, because we still have f(x; ?) = ? 6 = g(x), when x 2 A. Of course, some might say we de ned the wrong f, but in fact it is these \strict" identities we need to decide to settle the question of intensional identity. In practice we will need to work both with strict and with extended identities and we must keep the context clear.
We will use \=" to denote equality in the extended basic sets and set x# () 
but some t i is free or a constant and is not the ith variable or constant in the pattern x; u; x; y; v, then again the expression evaluates to c, by the de nition of r. Thus z i depends on !, x, y only when at most t 1 , t 3 or t 4 are free, and those among them which are free are set to the corresponding value x, x or y. If all three are free in some such z i , then the lemma clearly holds. In the opposite case the partial function ! satis es an identity of the form !(x; x; y) ' h(!; !( ; x; y); !(x; ; y); !(x; x; ); !( ; ; y); !( ; x; ); !(x; x; )); (72) where h is a monotone operation on partial functions and is the algebraic notation for -abstraction, e.g., !( ; x; ) = (s; t)!(s; x; t): For example, suppose z i (st)r(x; u; s; t; v) = ; then (s; t) ' ( !(x; s; t); if s 2 D x ; t 2 D y ; c; otherwise; so that z i = h i (!(x; ; )) with a monotone h i . A similar evaluation of z i in terms of some section of ! is involved in each of the cases and the substitution of all these monotone h i 's into f yields a monotone operation. (65) is valid on any xed structure with in nite basic sets only if its two sides are identical.
We can view (64) as a special case of (63), with the following evaluation functional substituted for g on the right: ev k (p; x 1 ; : : :; x k ) ' p(x 1 ; : : : ; x k ): (66) Notice, however, that there are in nitely many such evaluation functionals. There are also in nitely many possible identities in form (63), because although f and g are chosen from a nite set, there is an in nite number of immediate expressions from which to choose the z i 's. The proof splits into two parts. First we will show that if we expand the structure by a xed, nite number of evaluation functionals, then every identity in form (64) is e ectively equivalent to one in form (63). In the second part we will show how to decide the validity of equations in form (63). (63) 4.5. Lemma. 17 Suppose the identity f(z 1 ; : : : ; z m ) ' p(w 1 ; : : :; w k ): (67) is valid in the structure A with in nite basic sets and w i r(x) is one of the terms on the right. Then there exists some z j on the left such that either w i z j , or z j (s 1 ; : : :; s k )r(ỹ) and r(x) can be obtained from r(ỹ) by the substitution of placed variables for s 1 ; : : : ; s k .
A basic variable v is placed in an identity
Proof. To keep the notation simple we assume that there is only one basic set and we consider the special case where w 2 r(x; u; x; y; v); u; v placed; x; y not placed: the object of Othello's belief would be the sense of the sentence`Cassio and Desdemona were lovers'. Since we cannot refer to sense directly in any fragment of natural language formalizable within FLR (if we identify it with intension), we might attempt to make belief an attribute of sentences, or (equivalently) their G odel numbers. This means that (59) is expressed by Othello believed`Cassio and Desdemona were lovers'; (60) where`Cassio and Desdemona were lovers' is the G odel number of the sentence within the quotes. But then we would certainly expect (60) to imply Othello believed`Desdemona and Cassio were lovers'; (61) and we would like to express in the language the general assertion that belief depends only on the sense, not the syntactic form of a sentence, i.e., Othello believes m & S A (m; n)] =) Othello believes n: (62) The Corollary says precisely that (62) is expressible already in LPC. The method is evidently quite general: if we view propositional attitudes as attributes of G odel codes, we can express in the language that they respect sense identity, those indeed which should respect it.
Proof of the Main Theorem 4.1. The intension of a term in a recursor structure is computed in the associated functional expansion by Def. 3.6 of 24], so we may assume that the interpretations f 1 ; : : :; f n of the function symbols of the language in A are functionals. We x such a functional structure A then and we assume (for the time being) that all basic sets in A are in nite. We will discuss the interesting case of nite basic sets at the end.
Since intensions are preserved by passing to the normal form, the problem of intensional identity on A comes down to this: given two irreducible, recursive terms 0 where fp 1 (u 1 ) ' 1 ; : : : ; p n (u n ) ' n g; 0 where fq 1 (v 1 ) ' 1 ; : : :; q m (v m ) ' m g; is n = m and can we match the terms so that they de ne the same functionals? By trying all possible ways to match the parts 16 and using the form of irreducible, explicit terms (2B.4 of 23]), we can further reduce the problem to that of deciding whether an arbitrary identity in one of the following three forms holds in A: f(z 1 ; : : :; z m ) ' g(z m+1 ; : : :; z l ); (63) f(z 1 ; : : :; z m ) ' p(w 1 ; : : : ; w k ):
(64) q(w 1 ; : : : ; w m ) ' p(w m+1 ; : : : ; w l ):
(65) Here the following conditions hold:
1. The functionals f and g are among the nitely many givens of A, or the constants t, f or the conditional.
x4 Sense identity and indirect reference. Van Heijenoort 29] quotes an extensive passage from a 1906 letter from Frege to Husserl which begins with the following sentence:
\It seems to me that we must have an objective criterion for recognizing a thought as the same thought, since without such a criterion a logical analysis is not possible." This could be read as asserting the existence of a decision procedure for sense identity, but unfortunately, the letter goes on to suggest that logically equivalent sentences have the same sense, a position which is contrary to the whole spirit of 12]. It is apparently not clear what Frege thought of this question or if he seriously considered it at all. Kreisel and Takeuti 17] raise explicitly the question of synonymity of sentences which may be the same as that of identity of sense. If we identify sense with referential intension, the matter is happily settled by a theorem.
4.1. Theorem. For each recursor structure A = (U 1 ; : : : ; U k ; f 1 ; : : : ; f n ) of nite signature, the relation A of intensional identity on the terms of FLR interpreted on A is decidable.
For each structure A and arbitrary integers n, m, let S A (n; m) () n; m are G odel numbers of sentences or terms (58) n ; m of FLR and n A m :
The rigorous meaning of 4.1 is that this relation S A is decidable, i.e., computable by a Turing machine. By the usual coding methods then, we get immediately:
4.2. Corollary. The relation S A of intensional identity on G odel numbers of expressions of FLR is elementary (de nable in LPC), over each acceptable structure A.
The Corollary is useful because it makes it possible to talk indirectly about FLR intensions within FLR. In general, we cannot do this directly because the intensions of a structure A are higher type objects over A which are not ordinarily 15 members of any basic set of the universe of A. One reason we might want to discuss FLR intensions within FLR is to express indirect reference, where Frege's treatment deviates from his general doctrine of separate compositionality principles for sense and denotation. Frege argued that \the indirect denotation of a word is : : : its customary sense," so that in Othello believed that Cassio and Desdemona were lovers, (59) 15 If the universe of A contains the powerset of every basic set in it and the Cartesian product of every two basic sets, then of course it contains all recursors over basic sets and with suitably rich primitives we can develop the theory of intensions of A within LPCR. These are typed structures, however, of in nite signature, which lack a natural universe, a largest basic set. More interesting would be the structure of the universe of sets, whose only basic \set" is the class of all sets. The intensions of this structure are certainly not sets.
Proof (Kit Fine).
14 Given a graph with n nodes P 1 ; : : :; P n and k n 2 edges E 1 ; : : : ; E k , we construct a sentence (G) using P 1 ; : : :; P n , E 1 ; : : : ; E k and an additional Q as partial propositional variables. The sentence (G) is a where sentence with n + k + 1 parts, the head being Q( ) and the other parts of the form P i ( ) ' P i ( ); (i = 1; : : : ; n); E j ( ) ' P b(j) ( ) _ P e(j) ( ); (j = 1; : : : ; k); where for each j, P b(j) and P e(j) are respectively the beginning and the end nodes of the edge E j . The construction is obviously polynomial and it is quite trivial to verify that two graphs are isomorphic exactly when the corresponding sentences have the same intension, directly from the de nition of recursor identity. a All the sentences constructed in the proof receive no truth value, they are silly and complex versions of the truthteller. One can build more interesting examples of complex intensions, but this simple construction exhibits the complexity of deciding intensional identity, the graph isomorphism problem being notoriously di cult.
3.7. A recursor structure of signature = (B; ff 1 ; : : :; f n g; d) is an interpretation of FLR( ) where the function symbols are interpreted by recursors, i.e., a tuple A = (U; f 1 ; : : : ; f n ), where each f i is a recursor with head xed point a functional f i of type d(f i ). We can think of every functional structure as a recursor structure, identifying its functionals with the associated trivial recursors which compute them, as in 3.3. Recursor structures arise naturally when we enrich a language by adding a new symbol to express a complex notion, and then we want the new symbol to be interpreted by the complex meaning of the expression it replaces. Kripke's language is naturally interpreted in recursor structures, since (at the least) we want the ordinals attached to sentences to be part of the interpretation of T. The theory of intensions generalizes directly to the category of recursor structures, which is the natural context for it.
3.8. Non-minimal xed points. In 19], Kripke discusses several possibilities of interpreting self-referential sentences by choosing xed points other than the least one. He says that \the smallest xed point is probably the most natural model for the intuitive concept of truth," and the algorithmic analogy supports this. On the other hand, the referential intension of a sentence determines not only the smallest xed point but all of them; thus, if we identify sense with referential intension, we do not lose those aspects of meaning which may be represented by the non-minimal xed points. For example, Kripke calls the liar \paradoxical" because it cannot have a truth value in any xed point of T A . The paradoxical nature of the liar is coded by its referential intension, a recursor with the property that none of its simultaneous xed points yields a truth value. Finally, the \bald King of France" sentence (36) has the following normal form, assuming that both KF(x) and B(x) are prime formulas: BKF A P(q( )) where fP (x) ' B(x); q( ) ' the (R); R(x) ' KF (x)g: Its intension has four parts, the head being bkf 0 (P; q; R) ' P(q( )): This and the preceding two examples illustrate the simple form of the intensions of sentences in LPC, even when we extend it with description operators or (quite easily) generalized connectives and quanti ers, modal operators and the like. They describe recursions which, however non-constructive (when the functionals in the structure are non-constructive), they are trivial as recursions, they \close" in a nite number of steps. Except for the imagery of algorithms, the theory on this level is really not that much di erent from Church's (Alternative 0 version) in 1] or Cresswell's, which could cover the same ground with the introduction of a natural equivalence relation on proposition surrogates or structures. It is, of course, the algorithm imagery which justi es the transformations by which we reduce sentences to normal form, compute their intensions and then use the natural identity of these recursors to get precisely the equivalence relation which is needed. When we add self-reference to the language we obtain the less trivial intensions of formulas such as the truth predicate, which describe more interesting recursions. We also make considerably more complex the relation of intensional identity.
3.6. Theorem. The problem of graph isomorphism for nite (unordered) graphs is polynomially reducible to the problem of intensional identity, for sentences of LPCR on any structure. 11, 10] have been developed and found fruitful applications in many parts of logic, set theory and computer science based on this idea. The results in this subject are typically stated in the form of extensional properties of various collections of \computable" or \recursive" functions, but the proofs always depend on intensional properties of the recursions by which these functions are de ned. For example, Kripke 19] states at the end of his paper that (on an acceptable structure) the relations weakly de nable in his language are exactly the inductive relations, and those strongly de nable (by formulas with no truth gaps) are the hyperelementary relations. This is an extensional statement, but its proof depends on the Stage Comparison Theorem 2A.2 of 21], which is most naturally understood as a statement about the lengths of the \abstract computations" by the recursor T A .
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The intension of the liar P( ) where fP ( ) ' :P ( )g is the recursor l = l 0 ; l 1 ]; where l 0 (P) ' P( ); l 1 (P) ' :P ( ); (56) and that of the truthteller P( ) where fP ( ) ' P( )g is tt = l 0 ; l 0 ]: (57) We can read these directly from the sentences involved, because they are so simple. In general we need to reduce a sentence by the reduction calculus of 23] which preserves intensions, until we bring it to an irreducible normal form, from which we can read o its intension.
Suppose R, Q are interpreted by converse relations R, Q in a structure and a, b are constants interpreted by elements a, b. The reduction calculus gives the normal forms R(a; b) A R(p 1 ( ); p 2 ( )) where fp 1 ( ) ' a; p 2 ( ) ' bg; Q(b; a) A Q(p 2 ( ); p 1 ( )) where fp 2 ( ) ' b; p 1 ( ) ' ag; and the three-part intensions that we can read o these normal forms are equal (via the permutation (1) = 2, (2) = 1) precisely because R and Q are converse relations. A similar computation shows that in general, & A & ; _ A _ : As an additional example from LPC, consider the sentence of (4). We exhibit some of the steps of its reduction to normal form, to illustrate the reduction calculus of 23]. The six-part intension of which can be read o this normal form is the recursor representation of the algorithm described by Steps (1){(4) in Section 1. 13 Kripke also associates with each sentence which has a truth value its level, the least ordinal at which his truth de nition yields that value. In algorithmic terms, this is precisely the length of the computation by the recursor T A on the G odel code of . A more natural level function assigns to each the length of the computation of the recursor int( ), with no appeal to G odel codes.
each sequence of variablesx which includes all the free variables of , a recursor int A (x; ) : X , ! W; where X is the space of all n-tuples (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) such that the type of x i matches that of the formal variable x i and W is the basic set with type that of the term . This referential intension int A (x; ) of in A computes the (functional) denotation den A (x; ) : X * W of in A. The recursive algorithms of A are the recursors which occur as intensions of FLR-terms on A, and the recursive functionals of A are their denotations.
The precise de nition of intensions given in 24] is a bit complex, 12 it depends on several technical results of 23] and we will not attempt to reproduce it here. The main task is to explain how recursive de nitions can be combined directly, without the introduction of extraneous, implementation dependent data structures, i.e., to interpret the formulas (50), (51) T i (u; P 1 ; : : : ; P n ) ' 8 A ( (y)P k (u; y)); T j (u; P 1 ; : : : ; P n ) ' 9 A ( (y)P k (u; y)):
On the account we are giving, T A is a recursive algorithm of A which computes the partial truth predicate T A . There is little doubt that on its own, T A is an interesting mathematical object, it is the semantic version of the de nition of truth. On the other hand, as an \algorithm," it cannot be implemented when A is in nite, however we de ne \implementations." So there is a real question whether it is useful to adopt the terminology of algorithms in connection with such in nitary objects: do our intuitions about algorithms garnered from constructing and analyzing nitary, step-by-step mechanical procedures carry over to help us understand and study such in nitary objects?
One point to consider is the standard and highly developed xed point theory of programs which (in e ect) interprets ordinary programs by recursive equations. Almost all the concepts and methods of this theory extend to arbitrary recursive algorithms, sometimes trivially, often with some extra e ort. Recursion in higher types 14, 15], 25], 13], recursion on admissible ordinals and set recursion 27], positive elementary induction 21] and other generalized recursion theories On this account, it seems natural to look for a more abstract notion of recursive algorithm which can be read directly from the equations (50), (51), just as its fundamental, implementation-free properties can be proved directly from (50), (51).
3.3. A recursor on a set X to W is any tuple of (partial, monotone) functionals f 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f n ] whose types are such that the equations (50), (51) which is exactly that determined by f, with the rst two equations interchanged.
The basic presupposition of the theory of recursive algorithms is that the fundamental mathematical and implementation-free properties of an algorithm can be coded by a recursor: put another way, to de ne an algorithm which computes a functional f, it is enough to specify a recursive de nition whose head least xed point is f. Notice that recursors, like iterators, need not be e ective in any way. To separate the iterative algorithms from the iterators we need to add a restriction of e ectivity, e.g., by insisting that all the objects of the iterator are nitely described, as in the case of Turing machines. In the theory of recursive algorithms we can only talk about relatively e ective algorithms, as follows.
3.4. Intensional semantics. Fix a functional structure A of signature as in 2.6. The theory of recursive algorithms associates with each term of FLR( ) and algorithm. We will review it brie y and discuss just two arguments in its favor, those most relevant to the purpose at hand.
3.2. The meaning of a recursive de nition. A typical mutual or simultaneous recursive de nition has the form p 1 (u 1 ) ' f 1 (u 1 ; p 1 ; : : : ; p n ; x); p n (u n ) ' f n (u n ; p 1 ; : : :; p n ; x);
where f 1 ; : : :; f n are (monotone) functionals on the individual arguments u 1 ; : : : ; u n ; x and the partial function arguments p 1 ; : : :; p n and we understand the de nition to determine for each value x of the parameter the simultaneous least xed points p x 1 ; : : : ; p x n , the least partial functions which satisfy its n equations in (50) with the xed x. We may choose to call the rst equation principal and say that the recursion de nes the partial function (u 1 ; x)p x 1 (u 1 ), or (more conveniently, following the syntax of LPCR) say that the recursion de nes the partial function f(x) ' f 0 (p x 1 ; : : : ; p x n ; x);
(51) where f 0 is one more functional associated with the recursion, its head.
It follows from early results of Kleene in the theory of recursion, that if we have for each i = 0; : : : ; n a Turing machine T i which computes f i (u i ; p 1 ; : : :; p n ) (with a suitable coding of the argument u i and access to \oracles" that yield on demand requested values for each of the p j 's), then we can construct a new Turing machine T which computes f. The argument generalizes easily to arbitrary iterators. Thus, it is argued, since recursion can be reduced to iteration, the notion of iterator is rich enough to represent algorithms expressed by recursive de nitions.
A serious problem with this analysis is that the claimed reduction of recursion to iteration is by no means unique or natural. If we apply any of the popular known reductions to the speci c, recursive de nition of the mergesort mentioned above, we get a Turing machine which spends most of its time building \stacks," implementing \calls" and copying parts of its tape, i.e., implementing recursion rather than sorting; and if we use another notion of computational model like the assembly language of some actual computing machine (especially one capable of substantial parallel computation), then we would likely use a di erent reduction procedure and execution of the resulting program will bear little discernible resemblance to the computation of the Turing machine allegedly expressing the same algorithm. At the same time, the most important properties of recursive algorithms are typically proved directly from the recursive equations which de ne them, without any reference to details of the speci c method by which we aim to reduce the recursion to iteration in order to implement it on a mechanical device. 11 3.1. An iterator (or abstract sequential machine) on the set X to W is a tuple f = (S; T; ; in; out); (46) where the following conditions hold.
1. S is a non-empty set, the states of f, and T S is a designated subset of terminal states.
2. : S ! S is a total function, the transition function of f. 3. in : X ! S and out : T ! W are the input and output functions of f. To compute with f on a given x 2 X, we rst nd the initial state in(x) associated with x and then we iterate the transition function beginning with this, 0 (x) = in(x); 1 (x) = ( 0 (x)); : : :; n+1 (x) = ( n (x)); : : :
(47) until (and if) we nd some n such that n (x) is a terminal state; if such an integer exists, we set N(x) ' (the least n) n (x) 2 T] (48) and we give as output the value of out on the terminal state N(x), f(x) ' out( N(x) (x)): (49) Equations (47), (48), (49) taken together de ne the partial function f : X * W computed by the iterator f.
In the most familiar example of a Turing machine with a one-way tape set up to compute a unary, partial function on the integers, states are triples (s; ; i) where s is an internal state of the machine, is a description of the tape with nitely many (non-blank) symbols on it and i is the scanned square; the transition function is determined by the nite table of the machine; (s; ; i) is terminal if the machine halts in the situation described by it; for each integer n, in(n) = (s 0 ; n ; 0), where s 0 is the initial, internal state and n is the tape with a string of n + 1 consecutive 1's on it; and out counts the consecutive 1's on the tape and subtracts 1 from them.
Turing's compelling analysis of mechanical computation in 28] establishes beyond doubt that every partial function on the integers which can be computed by a nitary, mechanical (deterministic) device can also be computed by a Turing machine, what we now call the Church-Turing Thesis. His arguments also make it quite obvious that the more general iterators can represent faithfully all the intensional aspects of mechanical computation, and I take \the orthodox view" to be that algorithms can be faithfully represented by these mechanical procedures.
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The theory developed in 22, 23, 24] starts from a radically di erent perspective which takes recursion rather than step-by-step computation as the essence of an as fragments of FLR, with special signatures and some \sugaring" of the notation; and the denotational semantics we de ned are special cases of the denotational semantics for FLR, which are treated in 23]. The mathematical theory of selfreferential semantics, referential intension and sense is best developed for FLR and then applied to the speci c cases of interest, but its usefulness and justi cation rest on these applications. x3. Recursive algorithms and referential intensions.
The distinction between an algorithm f and the object f computed by that algorithm|typically a function|is well understood. Consider, for example the need to alphabetize (sort) a list of words in some alphabet which comes up in a myriad of computing applications, from compilers of programming languages to sophisticated word processing programs. There are hundreds of known sorting algorithms and the study of their properties is a sizable cottage industry straddling theoretical and applied computer science: they all compute the same sorting function which assigns to every list of words its ordered version.
Equally clear is the di erence between an algorithm and its various implementations in speci c machines or the programs which express it in speci c programming languages. It is true that this distinction is sometimes denied by computer scientists who take a formalist or nominalist position towards the foundations of computing and recognize nothing but programs, their syntactic properties and the \symbolic computations" they de ne. Yet I have never known a programmer who did not know the di erence between \programming the mergesort algorithm in LISP" (a relatively trivial task) and programming the mergesort in some assembly language, a notoriously di cult exercise in introductory programming courses. What can the last quoted sentence possibly mean if there is no such thing as \the mergesort algorithm"? The question is surely more serious than this ippant remark would suggest, as serious as the general question of the formalist and nominalist approaches to mathematics, but this is not the place to address it seriously. Su ce it to say that I am adopting a classical, realist view which takes it for granted that algorithms \exist" independently of the programs which express them, much as real numbers \exist" independently of the de nitions which can be given for some of them in speci c formal languages.
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Although the concept of algorithm is universally recognized as fundamental for computer science, it is traditional to treat it as a \premathematical" notion and avoid de ning it rigorously. Where there is need for a precise de nition, for example in complexity theory, it is generally assumed that algorithms are faithfully represented by models of computation, automata, Turing machines, random access machines and the like. We record here the most general de nition of this type. 9 A sequence of recent court decisions in patent law may possibly lead to a legal distinction between a program and the algorithm it expresses! Euclid could get a copyright on the Elements, which includes a de nition of his famous algorithm for nding the greatest common divisor of two integers, but could he also patent the algorithm itself so that no one could use it without paying him a fee? Amazingly, the question came up in the courts in connection with the fast multiplication algorithm, which solves in a novel way a problem even more elementary than Euclid's. and we extend all partial relations so that x i = e A =) P(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) ' f; (i = 1; : : : ; n): (44) Notice that this makes the A (P) always de ned on total functions P, and (easily) it assigns the same truth values to sentences as Russell's theory of descriptions.
2.14. The programmer's solution. In an e ort to test Russell's solution by the experimental method, I posed directly to four friends the hot question: do you think that the King of France is bald? The one who knew too much responded \Russell thought not," but the other three gave me exactly the same, predictable answer: \there is no King of France." To make sense out of this thinking, we add a new element e (for \error") to the set of truth values TV , we decree (43) as above and we extend all partial relations so that x i = e A =) P(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) ' e: (i = 1; : : :; n): (45) We must also extend the connectives and quanti ers in the obvious way, to take account of the new truth value, e.g., t & e = e; t _ e = t; :e = e; 9 A (P) ' 8 > < > : t; if for some x 2 A; P(x) ' t; f; if for all x 2 A; P(x) ' f; e; if P is total ; (8x 2 A) P(x) 6 = t]; (9x 2 A) P(x) = e]:
This is a re nement of the Russell solution: when we know that there is no good way to interpret a descriptive phrase, we record an \error" and we let the Boolean operations propagate the error when they receive it from an argument they need. We might in fact enrich the set TV with a whole lot of distinct \error messages" which explain just what went wrong with the descriptions we attempted to compute, one of these error messages presumably being \there is no King of France". These functional interpretations of the yield denotational semantics for descriptive phrases which make it possible to view (the x) (x) as a constituent of every sentence in which it occurs while assigning to the correct (expected) denotation. Of course, denotations alone cannot account for the di erence in meaning between \Scott is the author of Waverly" and \Scott is Scott", both of them being true by any of the proposed solutions. These sentences mean di erent things because they have distinct referential intensions, the rst calling for us to check whether Scott indeed was Scott (a trivial algorithm) while the second requires that we verify whether Scott wrote the Waverly novels. We will de ne the referential intensions of descriptive phrases in the next section.
2.15. The Formal Language of Recursion FLR. In 23] we associated with each functional signature the Formal Language of Recursion FLR = FLR( ), a language of terms which in addition to the function symbols f 1 ; : : : ; f n of has basic and partial function variables over the types of and the additional type bool (standardly interpreted), constants t and f naming themselves, a conditional construct and a general where construct which allows recursive de nitions in all basic types. Quite obviously, we can view LPC, LPCR and its natural extensions 2.11. Descriptions. Suppose we now expand LPCR by a construct of the form 7 ! (the x) (x) (35) which assigns a term to every formula (x), where the variable x may or may not occur free in (x). We understand (35) as a new clause in the recursive de nition of terms and formulas, by which terms can occur wherever free variables can occur.
Notice rst that the where construct gives an easy mechanism to control the scoping of descriptions. For example, Russell's \bald King of France" example in 26] is best formalized by BKF The King of France is bald P((the x)KF(x)) where fP (x) ' B(x)g; (36) whose reformulation according to the theory of descriptions
is false, as Russell would wish it. If B(x) is a complex expression, as it most likely is, Russell's analysis of the simpler B((the x)KF(x)) might turn out to be true or false depending on the particular form of the formula B(x).
We naturally wish to set den(ỹ; (the x) (x))(ỹ) ' the A ( (x)den(ỹ; x; (x))(ỹ; x) (38) with a suitable functional the A : P(A; TV ) * A; (39) and it is clear that the A should satisfy (8x)P(x)# & (9!x)P(x) = t] =) the A (P) ' the unique x such that P(x) = t: (40) It is also clear that (to insure monotonicity) the A (P) cannot be always de ned, e.g., the A (;) will take no value. The question is how to set the A (P) when we know from the values of P that no P 0 P de nes a single object, i.e., when the following holds:
Error(P ) () (8x) P(x) ' f] _ (9x)(9y) x 6 = y & P(x) ' P(y) ' t]: (41) There are three plausible ways to proceed and we can label them by the denotational semantics for descriptive phrases which they generate. The proof of this is neither di cult nor surprising: we simply express the inductive de nition of T A (s) directly by a where formula of LPCR.
2.10. Kripke's language. Kripke 19] considers the formal extension of the language LPC of predicate logic by a single unary relation symbol T which is meant to denote (on acceptable structures) the truth predicate of the extended language containing it. To de ne the interpretation T of T (on G odel codes of sentences), he considers the natural inductive conditions that T must satisfy and then takes the least 8 partial relation which satis es these conditions; the truth value of a sentence then (when it has one) is the value T(s) of T on the G odel code s of . It is quite routine to de ne a recursive mapping 7 ! ( ) (34) which assigns to each formula of the language of Kripke a formula ( ) of LPCR which \means the same thing," and in particular has the same denotation: basically, we replace each occurrence of T by the LPCR formula which de nes T A on the appropriate argument. In particular, the usual versions of the liar and other \paradoxical" sentences which employ indirect self reference are expressible in LPCR and are assigned denotations in accordance with the grounded semantics of Kripke.
There is a lot of notation here and an appeal to results which are not as widely known as they might be, but the underlying idea is very simple. Consider the liar de ned by (6). The de nition gives value(liar) ' P( ); where P is the least solution of the equation P( ) ' :(P ( )); since the totally unde ned P = ; satis es this equation, the liar has no truth value and neither does the truthteller. For liar 0 we need the least solution of the equation P(x) ' :P (x) which is again ;, so that it too receives no truth value.
Consider also the following two versions of the ancestral, in which we will use the notation x y () x is a child of y and we take I and Euclid to be individual constants with xed references:
P (I ) where It is easy to verify that both and take the value t if, indeed, I am a descendant of Euclid. In the more likely, opposite case, it can be veri ed that will take the value f only if there is an upper bound to the length of ascending ancestral chains of the form I y 1 y 2 y n ; while will be de ned and false only when there is an upper bound to the length of descending chains of parenthood of the form Euclid z 1 z 2 z n : Both of these conditions are evidently true, but the rst one undoubtedly claims a bit more about our world (and the meaning of the relationship \child") than the relatively innocuous second one.
De nability in LPCR.
A (possibly partial) relation R A n is weakly representable in LPCR if there is a formula with free variables x 1 ; : : : ; x n such that R(x) () den(x; )(x) ' t; and strongly representable or just de nable in LPCR if we have R(x) ' den(x; )(x):
types, but it is important to notice that we are dealing with typed objects. 6 We will concentrate on this concrete example for the rest of this section, but everything we say generalizes directly to arbitrary functional structures which can be used to model languages with additional propositional connectives, generalized quanti ers, modal operators and the like.
2.7. The denotational semantics of LPCR. Fix a structure A as in (21).
With each formula and each sequence of (individual and partial relation) variablesx = x 1 ; : : : ; x n which includes all the free variables of , we associate a (partial, monotone) functional fx ; = den A (x; ) : X * TV ; where X is the space of all n-tuples (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) such that the type of x i matches that of the formal variable x i . The de nition is by induction on the length of and it is quite trivial, except for the case of the new primitive where of LPCR. For example, skipping the subscripts, den(x; x i = x j )(x) = eq A (x i ; x j ); den(x; R m (x i ; x j ; x k ))(x) = R m (x i ; x j ; x k ); den(x; _ )(x) ' ( )den(x; )(x) _ ( )den(x; )(x); den(x; (9y) (x; y))(x) ' 9 A ( (y)den(x; y; (x; y))(y;x)): (27) Notice the use of the dummy operation in the case of _, which is needed to turn an element in TV (or \the unde ned") into a partial, propositional constant. Proof that the operation de ned in each of these cases is a (monotone) functional is routine, depending only on the trivial fact that the composition of monotone, partial functions is also monotone.
For the less trivial case of the where construct, suppose 0 where fP 1 (ũ 1 ) ' 1 ; : : :; P n (ũ n ) ' n g and for eachx, use the induction hypothesis to de ne fx ;i (ũ i ; P 1 ; : : :; P n ) ' den(ũ i ; P 1 ; : : :; P n ; i )(ũ i ; P 1 ; : : : ; P n ); (i = 0; : : : ; n): Now the functionals fx ;i are all monotone and it follows from basic results in the theory of least-xed-point recursion that the system of equations P i (ũ i ) ' fx ;i (ũ i ; P 1 ; : : :; P n ); (i = 1; : : : ; n) (28) has a (unique) sequence of simultaneous least (as partial functions) solutions Px ;i , i = 1; : : :; n. We set den(x; )(x) ' fx ;0 (Px ;1 ; : : : ; Px ;n ): (29) We need to verify that this is a functional again, i.e., monotone, but the proof is quite direct.
The denotation of a sentence (with no free variables) is independent of its arguments and we set value( ) ' den( )( ):
We now de ne precisely (partial, monotone) functionals and functional structures. The complication is due to the unavoidable fact that these are typed objects, never too simple to deal with.
2.5. Partial, monotone functionals. A (many sorted) universe is any collection of sets U = fU ( u) j u 2 Bg indexed by some (non-empty) set B of basic types. Members of U ( u) are of (basic) type u in U . For each Cartesian product U = U ( u 1 ) U ( u n ); ( u 1 ; : : :; u n 2 B) and each W = U ( w), w 2 B, we let P(U; W) = fp j p : U * Wg be the set of all partial functions on U to W; the objects in P(U; W) are of partial function or pf type (( u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) * w) in U . We allow U to be the Cartesian product of no factors I, in which case the objects of pf type (() * w) are the partial constants of type w. A point type in B is any tuple x = ( x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), where each x i is either a basic or a pf type in B and a point of type x is any tuple x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) where each object x i has type x i in U . The (product) space of all points of type x is naturally partially ordered by (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) (y 1 ; : : :; y n ) () x 1 1 y 1 & : : : & x n n y n ; where i is just the identity = when x i is a basic type and for a pf type x i , i is the standard partial ordering on partial functions. Finally, a (partial, monotone) functional of type ( x * w) is any partial function f : X * W which is monotone in this partial ordering, i. For example, this representation of a standard rst-order structure A in (21) above has just two basic sets TV and A of respective basic types (say) bool and a. An n-ary partial relation P on A is a functional of type ((a n ) * bool) and similarly, an n-ary partial function p : A n * A is of pf and functional type ((a n ) * a). The functional & if of type (((() * bool); (() * bool)) * bool) and 9 A is of type (((a) * bool) * bool), as is 8 A . Not much is gained by computing these complex functions to understand the meaning of formulas in A, we also need the meaning of =, :, 8, 
These functionals represent the quanti ers because for every unary partial relation P, (9x 2 A) P(x) ' w] () 9 A (P) ' w; and more generally, on partial relations of any arity, (9x 2 A) P(x;ỹ) ' w] () 9 A ( (x)P(x;ỹ)) ' w; with the obvious meaning for the -operator on partial functions: the term 9 A ( (x)P(x;ỹ)) is equivalent to (takes exactly the same values as) the formula (9x)P(x;ỹ) on the set A.
Notice that 8 A (P) is not de ned if P is a partial relation which never takes the value f. However|and this is a basic property of these objects|both 9 A and 8 A are monotone, i.e., 9 A (P) ' One is tempted to interpret &, _ and by the usual, total functions on TV , but this will not work if we want to apply them to partial relations; because if _ were a binary function, then by the rules of strict composition we would have (P _ Q)#=) P # & Q#]; while we certainly want P ' t =) (P _ Q) ' t, even when Q is unde ned. We set instead: Notice that the sequenceũ i must be empty here when P i is a partial, propositional variable. The simplest examples of self referential sentences involve such \propositional re ection," e.g., the formal LPCR versions of the direct liar and truthteller intended by (6) and (7) are: liar P( ) where fP ( ) ' :P ( )g; truthteller P( ) where fP ( ) ' P( )g: (15) The more complex liar 0 (9x)P(x) where fP (x) ' :P (x)g (16) asserts that \the relation which is always equivalent to its own negation holds of some argument," and it too will have no truth value.
In the de nition of (denotational) semantics for LPCR which follows, we will adopt a general, somewhat abstract view of formal language semantics which is unnecessarily complex for predicate logic and just barely useful for LPCR. The extra e ort is worth it though, because this formulation of semantics generalizes immediately to a large class of languages (including rich fragments of natural language) and is indispensable for the description of referential intensions in the next section, even for the case of LPC. 
i.e., a function de ned on some of the m-tuples in X with range TV|notice the symbol \*" which suggests that for somex, P(x) may be unde ned. In dealing with partial functions, we will use the standard notations f(x)# ()x is in the domain of f; f(x) ' w () f(x)# and f(x) = w; f g () (8x; w) f(x) ' w =) g(x) ' w]; and we assume the usual (strict) composition rule so that (for example) f(g(x); h(x))#=) g(x)# and h(x)# : (19) We let ; = the totally unde ned partial function: (20) In set theoretic terms this is the empty set of ordered pairs and it is the least partial function in the partial ordering .
2.4. Structures for LPCR. We interpret LPCR in the usual structures of predicate logic, i.e., tuples of the form A = (A; R 1 ; : : : ; R l ); where A is some non-empty set and each relation R j interprets the corresponding formal relation symbol R j of the signature. With the convention just described, A is simply a sequence of functions on its universe A, with values in TV . Of course we need more than these the theory developed in 22, 23, 24] so that the gist of what we are saying can be understood without knowledge of these papers. On the other hand, the natural domain for this theory is the Formal Language of Recursion FLR de ned in 23] and in Section 4 we will prove the main result of the paper for this general case. This is the decidability of intensional identity for terms of FLR, on any xed structure, provided only that the signature (the number of primitives) is nite. Intensional identity is relatively trivial on sentences of predicate logic, but we will establish a non-trivial lower bound for its (decidable) degree of complexity for sentences of LPCR: as one might expect, once you are allowed self reference you can say the same thing in so many di erent ways, that it is not always obvious that it is still the same thing. Finally, the proof of decidability for intensional identity has independent interest and it gives some insight into the concept of a faithful translation. It also suggests an axiomatization for the logic of intensions, but we will not consider this here. x2. Languages with direct self reference.
A relational ( rst order) signature or similarity type is any set of formal relation (or predicate) symbols, each equipped with a xed, integer ( 0) arity. We assume the usual inductive de nition of formulas for the language LPC = LPC( ) of Lower Predicate Calculus (with identity) on the signature , with formal individual variables v 1 ; v 2 ; : : : and (for de niteness) logical symbols =; :; &; _; ; 9; 8. To obtain the language LPCR = LPCR( ) of Lower Predicate Calculus with Re ection (or self reference) on the same signature, we rst add to the basic vocabulary an in nite sequence P k 1 ; P k 2 ; : : : of formal k-ary partial relation variables, for each k 0. The number k is the arity of P k i . We call these \partial" relation variables because we will interpret them by partially de ned relations in the intended semantics, but syntactically they are treated like ordinary relation variables, so we add to the formation rules for formulas in LPC the following: 2.1. If P is a partial relation variable of arity k and x 1 ; : : :; x k are variables, then the string P(x 1 ; : : :; x k ) is a formula with free variables x 1 ; : : :; x k and P. In particular, for every partial, propositional variable P with arity 0, P( ) is a formula.
Self reference is introduced in LPCR by the following key, last rule of formula formation.
2.2. If 0 ; : : : ; n are formulas, P 1 ; : : : ; P n are partial relation variables and for each i,ũ i is a sequence of individual variables of length the arity of P i , then the string 0 where fP 1 (ũ 1 ) ' 1 ; : : :; P n (ũ n ) ' n g (14) is a formula. The bound occurrences of variables in are the bound occurrences in the head 0 and the parts 1 ; : : : ; n of , all the occurrences of P 1 ; : : : ; P n and the occurences of the individual variables of eachũ i in P i (ũ i ) ' i . this should mean that if two basic relation symbols R and Q are interpreted by (senseless) converse relations R and Q in a structure so that R(x; y) () Q(y; x); then for any two terms a, b, the sentences R(a,b) and Q(b,a) have the same sense, and they certainly have the same referential intension by our de nition. This, however cannot be deduced from their syntactic form.
Although they work in di erent contexts and they have di erent aims, Church in the more recent 1], Cresswell 6] and van Heijenoort 30] use variants of the same idea for getting the sense of a sentence, by replacing in it all the primitive syntactic constructs by their denotations. For example, the Cresswell sense and the Church propositional surrogate of R(a; b) are (essentially) the triple hR; a; bi. Both Church and Cresswell worry about introducing semantic import into meanings, but (if I understand them correctly), both would assign to R(a,b) and Q(b,a) the distinct triples hR; a; bi and hQ; b; ai. I cannot nd in such mechanisms a general device which can catch accidental, complex semantic relationships like that between a relation and its converse.
On the other hand, the idea that the sense of a sentence determines its denotation is at the heart of the Frege doctrine and practically everyone who has written on the matter uses some form of computational analogy to describe it. Perhaps closest to the present approach is Dummett's interpretation of Frege, most clearly quoted by Evans in a footnote of 9]: \This leads Dummett] to think generally that the sense of an expression is (not a way of thinking about its denotation], but) a method or procedure for determining its denotation. So someone who grasps the sense of a sentence will be possessed of some method for determining the sentence's truth value.: : :The procedures in question cannot necessarily be e ective procedures, or procedures we ourselves are capable of following." Evans goes on to call this view \ideal veri cationism" and says that \there is scant evidence for attributing it to Frege." Dummett himself says in 8] that \ Frege's basic argument about identity statements] would be met by supposing the sense of a singular term to be related to its reference as a programme to its execution, that is, if the sense provided an e ective procedure of physical and mental operations whereby the reference would be determined." If we replace \programme" and \execution" by \algorithm" and \value", then this comes very close to identifying sense with referential intension. What we add here, of course is a speci c, mathematical notion of recursive algorithm which makes it possible to develop a rigorous theory of sense.
Outline of what follows
We will state the basic de nitions in the body of the paper for the simple to describe language LPCR and we will include enough expository material about the word \sisbands" to English with the stipulation that it expresses the same thing as \married to sisters", and then it will be a primitive of the new, extended English with a complex sense. We do this all the time both in natural and in formal languages. On the other hand, there are accounts of language which deal with this phenomenon in other ways and insist that the \ultimate" (atomic) primitives of a language cannot mean anything complex. It has also been argued that there is no coherent way to assign a non-trivial sense to some historical proper names like \Odysseus"or \Aristotle", cf. Kripke 18] and Donnellan 7] . If some of the primitives of the language stand for such atomic relations or directly denoting proper names, then in the modeling proposed here they will be assigned a trivial sense which is completely determined by their denotation. Our aim in this paper is to propose a logical mechanism which explains how complex senses can be computed from given (complex or simple) senses and there is nothing in the arguments and results of this paper which favors or contradicts the direct reference theory for names, or any theory of logical atomism for language.
1.7. Sense identity and intensional logic. Granting any precise, semantic de nition of the sense of sentences of some language on some structure A, put A () sense A ( ) = sense A ( ):
(13) Do we always have ( & ) A ( & ) or :: A ? Is the relation A of sense identity on a xed structure decidable? Can we give a useful axiomatization for the class of sense identities valid in all structures and is this class decidable? Once we identify sense with referential intension, these questions become precise mathematical problems and they can be solved. The answers (even for a restricted language) will help us sharpen our intuition about sense, particularly as Frege is apparently quite obscure on the question of sense identity, cf. 29]. Incidentally, as one might expect, ( & ) and ( & ) are intensionally equivalent with the standard interpretation of & but :: has a more complex intension than .
Previous Work
Where sense is de ned in the literature, it is often identi ed with some version of proposition in the sense of Carnap, i.e., the sense of is the function which assigns to each possible world W the truth value of in W. For example, Montague 20] adopts this de nition. This does not explain the di erence in meaning between arithmetic sentences like and above which presumably have the same truth value in all possible worlds. Church 2, 3, 4, 5] makes (essentially) two proposals for axiomatizing the relation of sense identity without giving a direct, semantic de nition of sense. It is hard to compare such approaches with the present one, because they do not allow for speci c, semantic import into the notion of sense, sense by them depends only on syntactic form. For example, according to Frege \John loves Mary" and \Mary is loved by John" should have the same sense. In a technical formulation, truth gaps in languages with self reference in terms of non-convergence of computations, a phenomenon which is quite common and well understood in the theory of algorithms.
1.5. Faithful translations. There is a special word in Greek, \ ", for the important relationship between two men whose wives are sisters. Most speakers of both Greek and English would agree that \Niarchos and Onassis married sisters" (10) is a faithful translation of \ ", (11) even if they had never heard of Niarchos or Onassis and knew nothing about their wives; and no reasonable person would claim that \Niarchos and Onassis were rivals" (12) is a faithful translation of (11), although (as it happens) it is true, as is (11), and it is much closer in grammatical structure to (11) than (10)|\were" literally translates \ ". What makes (10) a faithful translation of (11) is that they both express the same algorithm for determining their truth: check to see if at any time Niarchos and Onassis were married to two sisters. On this account, we can de ne a faithful translation (at the sentence level) as an arbitrary syntactic transformation of sentences from one language to another which preserves referential intension, and that would apply even to languages with radically di erent syntax and distinct primitives, provided only that they both have a grammatical category of \assertoric sentence." The idea is direct from Frege who says that \the same sense has di erent expressions in di erent languages, or even in the same language" and that \the di erence between a translation and the original should properly preserve sense]." Some claim that faithful translation is impossible, though I have never understood exactly what this means, perhaps because I was unable to translate it faithfully into Greek. In any case, the precise de nition proposed here provides a technical tool for investigating the question rigorously. It may be that only fragments of Greek can be translated faithfully into English, or that we can only nd translations which preserve some properties of the referential intension, and then we could study just what these fragments and these properties are. A typical application to formal languages is that Kripke's language can be translated faithfully into LPCR but not conversely, essentially because direct self reference is expressible in LPCR while Kripke's language allows only indirect self reference. The languages are denotationally equivalent (on most interesting structures), i.e., the same relations are de nable by their formulas.
1.6. Primitives with complex sense. In de ning the appropriate structures for sense semantics, we will allow the primitives of a language to express arbitrary senses which may be complex, as we assumed above to be the case with \ " in Greek. This is technically convenient, both in developing a practical theory of translation and also for dealing with de nitions: if we get tired of referring to Onassis and Niarchos as \married to sisters", we may want to add simply as : (8); (8) (9): (9) These sentences have no problematic constituents and appear to be meaningful, we certainly understand at least the liar well enough to argue that it cannot have a truth value. In a Fregean approach we would expect both of them to have sense, and in fact di erent senses, since we understand them di erently. A natural way to read this version of the liar (6) as an algorithm for computing its truth value leads to the single instruction
Step (1). Do step (1); if the value t is returned, give the value f; if the value f is returned, give the value t.
Similarly understood, the truthteller leads to the instruction
Step (1). Do step (1) and give the value returned.
The circular nature of these instructions corresponds to the self reference of the sentences, but there is nothing unusual about circular clauses like these in programs. The algorithms de ned by them are recursive algorithms and (in this case, as one might expect), they do not compute any value at all, they diverge: on this account, neither the liar nor the truthteller have a truth value. On the other hand they have distinct referential intensions, because the instructions above de ne different algorithms.
To de ne the referential intension of self referential sentences we need recursive algorithms. We state this condition somewhat cryptically here; it will be explained in Section 3.
Recursive de nitions de ne algorithms directly.
Kripke 19] has developed a rigorous semantics (with truth gaps) for a formal language which can de ne its own truth predicate, so that it can express indirect self reference and the more familiar versions of the liar and the truthteller. We will introduce in Section 2 the language LPCR of Lower Predicate Calculus with Re ection (or self reference), a richer and easier to use version of the language of Kripke which we will then adopt as the basic vehicle for explaining referential intensions. The denotational semantics of LPCR are Kripke's grounded semantics, by which all reasonable expressions of the liar and the truthteller fail to denote and cannot be distinguished. On the other hand, every sentence of LPCR (and a fortiori the less expressive language of Kripke) will be assigned a recursive algorithm for its referential intension, a Fregean sense which distinguishes these sentences from one another.
5
Part of the interest in this application is that it \explains" 5 Calling this notion of sense for LPCR \Fregean" stretches the point a bit, since Frege counted non-denoting signs an imperfection of natural language and wished them banished from the language of mathematics. Nevertheless, we will see that its properties match quite closely the basic properties of sense assumed by Frege. we need from the theory of recursive algorithms 3 developed in 22, 23, 24] . From this simple example, however, we can already see two basic properties algorithms must have if we are to use them in this way.
1.1. Algorithms are semantic (mathematical, set theoretic) objects. This is almost self evident, but we list it because there is some general tendency in the literature to confuse algorithms with programs, like the instructions above. A program is a piece of text, it means nothing uninterpreted; its interpretation (or one of them) is precisely the algorithm it de nes, and that algorithm is no longer a syntactic object. On the account we are giving, the relation between a program and the algorithm it de nes is exactly that between a sentence and its sense.
1.2. Algorithms are relatively e ective, but they need not be e ective in an absolute sense. Consider step (4) above which calls for the examination of the entire extension of the relation Q and cannot be \implemented" by a real machine if A is in nite. It is a concrete, precise instruction and it is e ective relative to the existential quanti er, which we surely take as \given" when we seek the sense of sentences of predicate logic. Put another way, the claim that we understand entails that we understand the quanti ers which occur in it and the speci c instructions of the intension simply \codify" this understanding in computational terms. E ective computability relative to assumed, given, in nitary objects has been studied extensively, especially in the work of Kleene in higher type recursion.
There is a third, fundamental property of algorithms we need which will be easier to explain after we discuss the rst of three applications we intend to make of the proposed modeling of sense.
1.3. Self referential sentences. One of the main reasons for introducing sense is so that we may assign meaning to non-denoting names. Frege makes it clear that sentences may also fail to denote, but he only gives examples where the lack of a truth value is due to a non-denoting constituent proper name. There is, however, another stock of such examples in the self-referential sentences which are usually studied in connection with developing a theory of truth. Consider the following bare bones version 4 of the liar which avoids the use of a truth predicate, it is not the case that (6),
and the corresponding version of the truthteller, it is the case that (7).
(7) Here we understand \it is the case" and \it is not the case" as direct a rmation and negation, i.e., with less regard for readability we could rewrite these de nitions di er from that of ? Our aim here is to propose a precise (mathematical, set theoretic) de nition of Fregean sense and to begin the development of a rigorous sense semantics which explains di erences in meaning like that between and . The mathematical results of the paper are about formal languages, but they are meant to apply also to those fragments of natural language which can be formalized, much as the results of denotational semantics for formal languages are often applied to fragments of natural language. In addition to the language of predicate logic whose sense semantics are fairly simple, the theory also covers languages with description operators, arbitrary connectives and modal operators, generalized quanti ers, indirect reference and the ability to de ne their own truth predicate.
To explain the basic idea, consider a typical sentence of predicate logic like the arithmetical sentences above, but simpler:
(8x)(9y)R(x; y) _ (9z)Q(z): (4) Here R and Q are interpreted by relations R, Q on some domain A and we may suppose at rst, for simplicity, that A is nite. If we know nothing about R and Q but their extensions, there is basically only one way to determine the truth value of , by the following procedure.
Step (1). Do steps (2) and (4). If one of them returns the value t, give the value t; if both of them return the value f, give the value f.
Step (2). For each a 2 A, do step (3). If for every a 2 A the value t is returned, return the value t; if for some a 2 A the value f is returned, return the value f.
Step (3). Given a 2 A, examine for each b 2 A the value R(a; b). If one of these values is t, return the value t; if all these values are f, return the value f.
Step (4). For each c 2 A, examine the value Q(c). If one of these values is t, return the value t; if all these values are f, return the value f.
In contemporary computing terms, we have de ned an algorithm which computes the truth value of . What if A is in nite? An attempt to \execute" (implement) these instructions will lead now to an in nitary computation, but still, the instructions make sense and we can view them as de ning an ideal, in nitary algorithm which will compute (\determine" may be better now) the truth value of A. This algorithm is the referential intension or just intension of , int( ) = the algorithm which computes the truth value of ;
(5) and we propose to model the sense of by its referential intension.
Plainly, we mean to reduce the notion of \sense" to that of \algorithm" and we must specify which precise notion of algorithm we have in mind. We will put this o until Section 3, where we will also review brie y the de nitions and results In his classic 1892 paper On sense and denotation 12], Frege rst contends that in addition to their denotation (reference, Bedeutung), proper names also have a sense (Sinn) \wherein the mode of presentation of the denotation] is contained." Here proper names include common nouns like \the earth" or \Odysseus" and descriptive phrases like \the point of intersection of lines L 1 and L 2 " which are expected by their grammatical form to name some object. By the second fundamental doctrine introduced by Frege in the same paper, they also include declarative sentences: \ a simple, assertoric sentence is] to be regarded as a proper name, and its denotation, if it has one, is either the True or the False." Thus every sentence denotes (or refers to) its truth value and expresses its sense, which is \a mode of presentation" of its truth value: this is all there is to the meaning of a sentence as far as logic is concerned. Finally, Frege claims that although sense and denotation are related (the rst determines the second), they obey separate principles of compositionality, so that the truth value of a complex sentence is determined solely by the denotations of its constituent parts (terms and sentences), whatever the senses of these constituents parts may be. This is the basic principle which has made possible the development of sense-independent (two-valued, classical) denotational semantics for predicate logic, a variety of richer formal languages and (at least) fragments of natural language.
Consider, for example, the arithmetical sentences 1 + 0 = 1; (1) there exist in nitely many primes;
(2) there exist in nitely many twin primes:
(3) The rst two are true, the third is a famous open problem. Surely we understand all three and we understand them di erently, even as we recognize the rst two to be true and concede that we do not know the truth value of the third. Frege would say that they mean di erent things because they express di erent senses, but he did not de ne sense: what exactly is the sense of and how does it
